Civil wars have become the dominant form of armed conflict in the international system in the past few decades. These internal conflicts have proven exceedingly difficult to resolve (through either negotiated settlement or victory by one side) and a number of factors have contributed to this, from multiple warring parties to rough terrain, to military interventions.
1 Moreover, while these wars often occur within a single state, the international community seldom treats civil wars as solely a domestic problem for governments facing such challenges. Individual states and international organizations get involved in these disputes in a number of ways, both humanitarian in nature and overtly self-interested. 2 Yet, despite the concerted effort by the international community aimed at ending civil wars, internal conflicts are frequently long lasting and hard to resolve conclusively.
Existing literature demonstrates that third parties external to a civil war can play both conflict promoting and conflict inhibiting roles. Guarantees by third parties make negotiated settlements more likely (Walter 2002) . Direct external support to states and rebels, in contrast, has been identified as playing a significant role in prolonging civil wars on average (Regan 2002) . In general, this literature has focused on the effects of direct external support, including how it can generate a conflict sustaining balance of power between actors, its potential for conflict management, and how third parties can introduce additional veto players that make settlement more difficult. These approaches are all rooted in the idea that "support" or a "guarantee" will be in the form of military might (i.e., allocation of troops or direct military intervention).
Yet, we know empirically that there are other types of support provided to combatants in civil war. We argue that not all forms of support offered in civil war will have commensurate effects, and different types of support (such as monetary support, arms, information, and the ability to base in an external territory) can have different effects on the chance of civil wars ending. Specifically, we argue that the most fungible resource given to rebels in civil war (particularly direct financial support) generates uncertainty about rebel capability, and this in turn decreases the chance of resolution by increas-ing uncertainty about possible settlement options and exacerbating rebel commitment problems that prohibit settlement. In our empirical analysis, we find varying effects of different types of external support to rebels. We find that providing more fungible types of support (such as financial support or arms transfers) corresponds with a decreased chance of civil war termination, but other types of support do not have this effect or have an opposing effect.
In this article, we propose a micro-foundational story for the government's often observed reluctance to sign a peace agreement when the rebels are receiving external support. Our explanation is linked explicitly to how fungible the external support for rebels is, and the government's uncertainty surrounding how such support translates to fighting power for rebels. As the ongoing civil war in Syria demonstrates, the extent and nature of support to rebels can be extremely unclear. The Syrian opposition appeared to believe support was forthcoming at the outset of the war, while the regime had been skeptical about what that support would look like. Open debate within external states, particularly the United States, over whether and how to support the Syrian opposition is just one example of the tenuous nature of such support. Similarly, while Russia is clearly supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, the extent, continuation of, and effects of that support are debated, making it difficult to predict the future course of the war.
The possibility of (and uncertainty surrounding) support to rebels plays a key role in rebels' and governments' assessment of rebel prospects in war. Rebels have differential ability to bear the costs of conflict and to attack the state, which are a key part of determining when rebels should want to fight or settle with the state.
3 Using a formal model, we argue that rebels that receive highly fungible financial support have a higher possibility of quick changes in their ability to bear the costs of war. These changes in ability to bear costs undermine rebels' promises about settling with the state. Negotiations to resolve civil war often span years and governments may see the resolution process as a strategic waiting period that rebels use until their fortunes change when rebels have relied on external support. 4 Thus, civil wars where rebels have quickly changing war making abilities will be longer. Employing a novel formal model, we find that the effect of highly fungible external support is as likely, if not more likely, than a shift in military power to prolong conflict (which has been the dominant explanation of conflict-lengthening commitment problems to date). This explanation differs from the typical treatment in the existing literature because it is the rebels' inability to agree to any peaceful resolution of the dispute that the government would find profitable compared to continued fighting, not the government's inability to agree to a settlement, that causes civil conflict to persist (Fearon 1998 , Fearon 2004 , Powell 2004 , Powell 2006 . 5 The uncertainty concerning how different types of external support influence rebel war making capacity and not simply rapid shifts in power creates conflict sustaining bargaining problems. Therefore, it is a combination of the government's uncertainty about the rebels' expected utility of fighting (a product of the cost and benefits it anticipates) and the nature of the external support that rebels receive that combine to prolong civil conflict. This deduction from the formal model is evaluated with historical data on civil wars over the time period . The analysis shows a robust empirical relationship between highly fungible external support to the rebels and civil war termination.
This article makes several contributions to our understanding of civil war. We show formally that external support to rebels can inhibit settlement beyond simply creating parity between rebels and the state. Different types of external support have different effects on bargaining between states and rebels. We are also the first to demonstrate systematically in a large-N study the conflict-promoting role of highly fungible external support to rebels. Rebels that receive highly fungible external support from parties external to the conflict are the least likely to see war end. This suggests an alternative explanation for the link between external support and conflict duration.
External Support and Civil War
Support to combatants in civil war is argued to have varied effects on whether conflict is resolved. Scholars have emphasized the role that intervention plays in creating or sustaining a balance of power among parties to a civil war (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2002; Licklider 1993) . Some argue that it is a balance of capabilities that allow war to continue as neither side is able to achieve military victory.
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Others suggest that the goals of the intervener are critical to determining the effect of intervention. Regan (2002) shows that unilateral interventions generally lead to longer civil wars, but that "unbiased" interventions can shorten wars. Cunningham (2010) demonstrates that when a third party brings an independent agenda to the dispute (that is, the intervener has goals distinct from any warring party), civil wars are longer. Walter (2002) shows that the threat of intervention in the post-conflict stage of a dispute can help resolve civil war, while Cetinyan (2002) shows the key role that potential external intervention can play in conflict situations.
Most of these studies focus on direct military intervention (or the threat thereof) by third party states. Studies that explore a broader set of actions and actors have not emphasized the degree to which support for rebels is a tenuous endeavor. Corbetta and Dixon (2005) examine external intervention in terms of diplomatic, economic, and military intervention in their exploration of whom intervenes. Regan and Aydin (2006) also show that when we include mediation in our understanding of intervention, diplomatic interventions can help resolve civil wars.
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Though much of the existing work on external support in civil wars has focused on direct intervention, there are a number of ways that outsiders provide support to parties in a civil war. Salehyan (2009) shows the importance of territory provided by neighboring states in sustaining insurgency. Byman (2007) highlights how states support conflict more generally through the funding of terrorist groups.
Moving beyond large-scale interventions by states and the contribution of troops, sup-port to rebels is diverse and multifaceted, occurring in a number of ways and coming from External support to rebels then, is more nuanced that just intervention or not. Support for rebels can be complicated, coming from many sources, and is apt to change quickly, especially compared to the relative stability of government capabilities. Withdrawing financial support or intelligence and training can occur rapidly and likely with less oversight than either initiating or ending major military intervention.
The Rebels' Bargaining Problem
The stylized presentation of bargaining between the rebels and the government is often described as a process of the rebels making demands on the government, and the government making concessions to the rebels. 9 Yet, the government usually holds a disproportionate share of the bargaining leverage. Since most governments have a standing army, they are better equipped to impose their most preferred outcome through the use of force. Though rebels can try to induce concessions by inflicting costs on the state, there is little uncertainty in most cases about which side would win in the event of a fight to the finish that employed all resources because of this stark asymmetry in military capacity. The government knows that in a total conflict with the rebels, the odds are in its favor. The rebels also know this.
What keeps the government from simply using military force to eliminate the rebels is that conflict is risky and costly. 10 The government is often uncertain about the rebels' utility for fighting, including their ability to bear the costs of continued fighting in light of different types of support they receive. Rebel groups often have highly variable resource endowments (whether from lootable resources or outside support). Walter (2009) argues that rebel groups must send a costly signal of their capacity before the government will agree to concessions because governments have strong incentives to only bargain with rebel groups that have the capacity to inflict high levels of damage. Although the rebels lack the military capacity of the government, the rebels are in a position to extract concessions from the government when fighting is costly for the government and the government is uncertain about the rebels' ability to continue fighting. Moreover, when the government is uncertain about the rebels' costs of fighting, the rebels have an incentive to misrepresent their true costs. If the rebels can convince the government that their costs of fighting are low, the rebels can extract more concessions from the government.
While the rebels can benefit from the government's uncertainty about their utility for fighting by bluffing their way to more concessions, these potential benefits do not come without risks. The risks to the rebels are two-fold. First, if the government is uncertain about the rebels' utility for fighting, the government may, based on the information they have about the rebels' expected costs and benefits, make an honest concession to the rebels that the rebels will reject, resulting in a continuation of civil conflict. That is, the government offers less than it might be willing to give because it has incorrectly estimated the costs that rebels can bear and the benefits of fighting with the state. Second, if the rebels successfully convince the government that their costs of continued fighting are very low (in an attempt to gain more concessions), this may cause the government to prefer continued fighting to bargaining with the rebels. This is because the government may believe that the rebels have an incentive to continue or restart the fight in the future. This bargaining problem can cause the government to forgo making concessions and continue to fight. 11 When the rebels' costs of resuming fighting after bargaining are low, the government believes that the rebels will have difficulty agreeing to any present day peace settlement. Knowing this, the government prefers to continue fighting.
Highly Fungible External Support and Uncertainty
Rebel recruitment, funding, and extractive capacity are variable across rebel groups, and likely to vary within them as well (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2005 
Model
The purpose of this model is to illustrate how external support shapes the duration of an ongoing civil war. To make this illustration, consider the case of two risk-neutral actors, the government (1) and the rebels (2) in an ongoing civil war, bargaining over the terms of a peace agreement which has benefits that are continuously divisible and represented by the interval [0, 1] . If the actors reach a peace settlement, the agreement is represented by the pair (x, 1 − x) and the civil war ends. The government's share of this agreement is x ∈ [0, 1], and the rebels' share is 1 − x. The preferences of the government and the rebels are strictly opposed such that u 1 (x) = x and u 2 (1 − x) = 1 − x. The game begins by the government either continuing to fight the rebels or making them a take-it-or-leave-it peace settlement offer x ∈ [0, 1]. If the government continues to fight the rebels the outcome of the continuation of conflict depends on the probability that the government wins the conflict, p. The rebels win the conflict with the complementary probability 1 − p. Continuing to fight is costly for both the government and the rebels.
Therefore, both pay costs c i > 0 when fighting. The government's expected payoff from continuing to fight is p − c 1 and the rebels' expected payoff is 1 − p − c 2 .
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In lieu of continuing to fight, the government can offer the rebels a peace settlement.
If the government bargains with the rebels and the rebels accept the peace settlement, the payoff to the government is x and the payoff to the rebels is 1 − x. If the government offers the rebels a peace settlement and the rebels reject the settlement, civil war resumes and the outcome is determined by the new balance of powerp ≤ p. The payoff to the government from fighting after offering a peace settlement to the rebels isp − c 1 . If the rebels continue to fight after bargaining with the government, the rebels may receive external support that gives them benefits, e ≥ 0 and the opportunity to rebuild their forcesp ≤ p.
15 The payoff to the rebels from fighting after bargaining with the government is 1 −p − c 2 + e. External support can reduce the rebels' costs of continued fighting and therefore raises their expected value for resuming conflict. 16 If both actors are fully informed about the parameters of the game, the government will continue fighting the rebels rather than offering a peace settlement if e > (p − p) + (c 1 + c 2 ). Otherwise, the government will offer the rebels x =p + c 2 − e, and the rebels will accept this peace settlement. 17 The structure of this game is shown in Figure 1 . Although the protocol of the game is simple, it is consistent with other models of civil war duration (Fearon 2004) , and the results from games such as this tend to converge to results obtained from more complicated repeated games (Fey and Kenkel 2013) .
*** Figure 1 About Here*** If the value of the rebels' external support is greater than the difference between the shift of power and the total costs of civil war, e > (p − p) + (c 1 + c 2 ), the government will continue fighting the rebels rather than offering them a peace settlement. If the government continues to fight the rebels rather than offer a peace settlement, it is because the rebels are unable to agree to honoring the government's peace settlement. This bargaining problem is caused by the external support received after bargaining with the government. It is interesting to note that this break down in bargaining, caused by external support, can arise even when there is no shift in the distribution of power (e.g., whenp = p).
When the government and the rebels are fully informed, the game is solved for the Subgame Perfect Equilibria. Depending on the values of the parameters in the model there are two possible equilibria. When the parametersp, p, c 1 , c 2 combine to be less than e, then the government offers the rebels a peace settlement, and the rebels always accept.
Otherwise, the government prefers continued civil war to a peace settlement with the rebels.
When the government is uncertain about the benefits that the rebels will receive from external support, it is possible for the government to make the rebels a peace settlement that is rejected. To incorporate this dynamic, assume that the rebels know their own benefits from external support, but the government only knows that the benefits of external support is drawn from a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 0 and an
Introducing asymmetric information about the rebels' benefits from external support makes the government's decision to continue fighting or to offer a peace settlement more complicated and results in the usual risk-return trade-off:
the government weighs the benefits and the costs of making the rebels a peace settlement offer. The game with asymmetric information is solved for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, and there are three possible equilibria that depend on the parameters in the model. These equilibria are shown in Figure 2 and described in the Appendix. The region in the center shows the case where the government offers the rebels a peace settlement that the rebels may or may not accept. In this region, the government's beliefs about the upper bound of benefits from external support is:
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In this middle region, when civil war continues it is because of asymmetric information about the benefits of external support. When
, the government is indifferent between offering the rebels a peace settlement and continuing to fight. The region to the right shows the case where e + is sufficiently large and the government never offers the rebels a peace settlement. As a result, civil war continues without any bargaining because the rebels have a commitment problem. The government believes that the benefits from external support are potentially so great that they would prefer fighting to negotiation with the rebels.
When the government is unsure about how external support will benefit the rebels, a peace settlement is only sure to work when the upper bound on the benefits of external support is small relative to the costs of continuing to fight. As the upper bound on the rebels' benefits from external support increases, fighting is more likely because the rebels are more likely to reject any peace settlement from the government, and the government is less likely to be willing to negotiate with the rebels. Finally, we include is a measure of territorial support. This variable indicates whether a third party allowed the rebel group access to territory outside the dispute, including sanctuary or bases. As border crossing is common in civil conflicts particularly when state control is weak and borders are not well protected, territorial support is only coded if it can be shown that a third party deliberately provided territorial sanctuary or support to the rebels. About 14% of rebel groups in the study receive territorial support at some point during their conflict. All of the external support measures are drawn from the UCDP data.
Empirical Implications and Analysis
Previous work suggests that external factors that increase parity (or perceptions of parity) among warring parties will decrease the chance of war end. 30 Our argument does not contradict this expectation. However, we argue that when external support is highly fungible, its effects on the conflict will be less unclear, exacerbating uncertainty about both rebel fighting capacity and settlement possibilities in the dispute. Thus, our expectation in comparing types of support is that more fungible supports will decrease likelihood of war end, but less fungible supports will not necessarily do so.
In Models 3 through 5, we also include additional controls drawn from the literature to assess the robustness of our finding on fungible external support. First, we include a dummy for whether the disputes had intervention by a third party that is considered to bring independent preferences to the disputes. Wars with this type of intervention are likely to be more difficult to resolve (Cunningham 2010) . Second, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether the rebel group has a legal political wing, which Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) show to be associated with which rebels receives external support. Third, we include measures for several state-level factors commonly found to be associated with a higher probability of civil war. These include gross domestic product (logged) (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hendrix 2010) , whether the state is democratic (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001) , the population of the state (logged) (Raleigh and Hegre 2009) 
Analysis of Conflict Termination
We present three types of analysis in support of our argument that highly fungible external support makes conflict termination less likely. The first are a set of logistic regressions on the probability of war end. The second are duration models on time to war end.
The third set of models employ instrumental variable analysis to address the challenges of endogeneity in the study. Across all of these alternative empirical strategies, we find consistent and strong support for our argument that highly fungible external support makes ending civil war more difficult. have external financial support, the predicted probability of the conflict ending is about 23.27% in a given year; when rebels are supported with funds by an external actor, the mean predicted probability of conflict termination is about 11.16%. 35 This is consistent with our argument that external financial support creates uncertainty about the rebels' ability to bear the costs of war that can cause a conflict promoting credibility problem for rebels.
Externally provided arms have a similar effect on the chance of war end. Weapons support to rebels decreases the mean predicted probability of conflict termination in a given year. When rebels do not receive weapons support, the mean predicted probability of conflict termination is approximately 23.81%; when rebels receive weapons from a third party, the mean predicted probability of conflict termination decreases to about 10.38%.
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Direct troop support to rebels had a positive effect on the likelihood of war termination in three of four models. An end to fighting is approximately two times more likely when rebels get troop support as when they do not receive this type of external support. When rebels do not have external troop support, the mean predicted probability of the conflict ending is about 19.50%, when rebels are supported with troops from an external actor, the mean predicted probability of conflict termination is about 49.77%. 37 Neither territorial nor intelligence support yield a statistically significant finding for war termination.
This disaggregated examination of external support to rebels shows that the effects of support are not uniform, nor even in the same direction for the various types. Different types of external support have differential effects on conflict, which we miss when we examine just military intervention.
The results in Table 1 suggest that support to states has a negative effect on the chance of war ending, which is consistent with the literature on intervention more generally. The measure for rebel troop size returns negative and statistically significant coefficients in some specifications. The greater the size of rebel forces, the less likely war is to end in any given year. A move from the first to third quartile of values (from 1,000 troops to 10,000 troops) is associated with about a 7.73% decrease in the chance of war end.
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These findings on the effect of external financial support and weapons support are robust to the inclusion of a number of other factors. The negative effect of these highly fungible external supports holds when we control for many variables, including established determinants of war termination and predictors of who is likely to receive external support. Thus, the analyses demonstrate an independent effect of highly fungible external support on the chance that the war will end.
The logistic regression analyses demonstrate support for our central hypothesis. In
Model 4, we follow the recommendation of Carter and Signorino (2010) by including t, t 2 , and t 3 , which essentially inserts a hazard function into the model. To more directly examine the influence of external support on conflict duration, rather than a probability of ending in any given year, we run a second set of analyses using the Cox (1972) semiparametric, proportional hazards model.
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*** Table 2 About Here*** Table 2 reports the hazard ratios from four survival analyses that take into account the effect of different types of external support to rebels, as well as other factors, on conflict duration. 40 A hazard ratio of one suggests that the time to event, in this case conflict termination, is no different for rebels who receive external funding and those that do not. A hazard ratio that is significantly less than one suggests a longer time to conflict termination, whereas a hazard ratio greater than one indicates a shorter time to war end. In all models, the hazard ratio on financial support (the most highly fungible external support) is less than one and statistically significant. Direct financial support to rebels lengthens the conflict duration. Similarly, weapons support returns a statistically significant hazard ratio less than one. Both types of more fungible support make war longer. In contrast, the hazard ratios for other types of support are all greater than one, and the ratio for external troop support to rebels is significantly so.
Troop support to rebels leads to war end sooner than for rebels who are not aided with troops. Consistent with the results of the earlier models, these duration models also suggest that larger rebel and state armies serve to prolong the length of the conflict.
This dynamic is mirrored by the state; external support to states serves to significantly prolong the duration of the conflict.
These models suggest that some rebel group characteristics affect the time to termination, as well. Rebels with legal political wings see termination more quickly than rebels without a politically legitimate branch. Conversely, increasing troop strength, both the rebels' and the states', prolongs civil conflict; however, this result is moderated by the relative strength of the fighting partner's army. When rebels have a power advantage over the state (or are even at parity with the state in Models 2 -4), termination occurs more quickly than when the state has an absolute power advantage over the rebels. To some extent, this result mirrors our finding of the effect of sending in troop support to rebels. Together, these results suggest that all else equal, civil war termination is more likely (Table 1) and occurs more quickly (Table 2) when rebels have an advantage in terms of on the ground strength.
Two state characteristics also affect the time to termination: GDP per capita (logged) and the size of the country's population (logged). Models 3 and 4 (at the 90% confidence level) suggest that as the state's per capita GDP increases, termination occurs more quickly. However, population size seems to have the opposite impact (Models 3, 90%
confidence level, and Model 4) on the time to termination. These findings are consistent with the existing literature.
Both the logistic and cox duration models provide support for our argument that highly fungible external support has a unique effect of making conflict termination harder compared to other types of external support. Yet, since third parties choose to aid to rebels at least partly based on the characteristics of the civil conflict, there is potential for endogeneity bias. Endogeneity bias is a problem if third party financial aid is expected to be systematically correlated with unobservable factors related to the duration of civil conflicts. Lagging external support is a first step towards dealing with potential endogeneity; however, it is insufficient in dealing with potential omitted variable bias.
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We take a further step by employing an arguably more methodologically rigorous approach, the use of instrumental variables regression, whereby an instrumental variable is used to remove the potential bias in the estimated effect of external financial support to rebels on civil war duration. This instrumental variable should be correlated with external financial support to rebels, while also being uncorrelated with the unobservable factors related to conflict termination (the source of the endogeneity bias) Krueger 2001, Angrist and Pischke 2010) . As a word of caution, instrumental variables (IV) analysis is not a panacea, and whether it provides an improvement is dependent on the research design and the additional assumptions imposed by the use of IV.
Drawing on the econometric literature of foreign aid and civil conflict (de Ree and Table 3, where we regress third-party financial support to rebels on donor GDP, support the use of donor GDP as an instrument for external financial support: donor GDP is a statistically significant predictor of third-party financial assistance to rebels (p < 0.01).
Second, the instrument should not directly affect the outcome variable, in this case conflict termination, except through the mechanism of the endogenous variable. Although it is difficult to precisely identify the channel through which the instrumental variable impacts the outcome, it seems unlikely that donor GDP has a direct impact on conflict termination beyond its effect through third-party financial assistance to rebels. There are two pieces of evidence to support its independence. First, since donor GDP provides a yearly measure of the top three aid donors' GDP, it is non-differentially associated across rebel groups in the given year, irrespective of variation in conflict dynamics. Second, results of empirical tests provide additional support. Both the Wald test of exogeneity, which tests that the correlation parameter rho is equal to zero, and the Sargan-Hansen statistic, which provides a similar test of the null hypothesis that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term (Wooldridge 2002) , are statistically insignificant at the conventional 95% confidence level. 42 Together, these results suggest that donor GDP is an appropriate instrumental variable for third-party financial aid to rebels. Table 3 presents the regression of external financial support on the instrument (Model 1) and in turn, the estimation of the effect of external financial support on conflict termination through the use of the instrument, donor GDP (Model 2). *** Table 3 About Here***
The coefficient on external financial support to rebels is negative and statistically significant. Employing the instrumental variable analysis, we find that rebels that get this type of highly fungible support are less likely to see war end. Empirically, the conflict promoting effect of highly fungible external support persists when accounting for the potential endogenous allocation of third-party financial aid to rebels. 43 Troop support continues to have a significant and positive effect on conflict termination in this model, as does economic development as measured by GDP, while oil production retains a conflict-promoting role.
In sum, we have employed three different types of statistical analysis to examine whether highly fungible external support has a different effect on conflict than other types of external support, and whether it acts to prolong conflicts. We find substantial empirical support for this hypothesis; conflicts are harder to resolve when highly fungible external support is given to rebels.
Illustrating Variable Uses of Rebel External Support
Our large-N analyses provide a battery of support for the argument presented here. A brief look at some real world cases of external support to rebels will illustrate some of the dynamics we argue lead to the differential effects of external support. Specifically, we provide short anecdotal evidence demonstrating the varied use of financial and weapons support to rebels.
A central argument underpinning our model and findings is that financial support to rebels is fungible, and thus has somewhat unpredictable or uncertain effects on war process that ultimately led to offensive capacity. Yet, it would be difficult to predict at the outset when and how financial support would produce the end result of suicide attacks, or whether this process would be sustainable over time.
Similarly, though arms are not as innately fungible as money, we see evidence of rebels using arms to secure other resources. In Liberia, for example, rebels have traded arms across the Cote D'Ivoire border for motorcycles. In Cote D'Ivoire, the Forces Novelles rebels have traded guns for food and other goods (Schroeder and Lamb 2006) .
These brief examples serve to illustrate the plausibility of the assumptions underpinning our argument. Not all types of external support to rebels are directly translated into fighting capacity. Instead, more fungible resources are used in a variety of ways that have an uneven and uncertain impact on the fighting capacity of rebel groups. This uncertainty, in turn, makes conflict termination more difficult by undermining the ability of rebels to commit credibly to a settlement, and by reducing the ability of state to identify possible agreements that might end the war.
Conclusion
While existing work has shown that direct intervention in civil war often prolongs wars, it has largely focused on what military intervention adds to the disputes (e.g., greater strength, creating a balance of power, or adding additional preferences). Here, we argue that external support is more nuanced than that. Different types of external support are more or less fungible, allowing recipients to use them for aims other than direct fighting.
The degree to which external support to rebels is fungible or not conditions the impact it has on the bargain between states and rebel groups. Second, we show theoretically and empirically how attempts to help rebels achieve their goals through financial support (or even arms transfers) may actually be harmful.
Most actors offering funds to rebels ostensibly want to assist them in gaining something from the state, even if the chance of outright victory is low. 45 If, in addition to increasing the resources that rebels have, highly fungible external support exacerbates bargaining problems for rebels, then the net effect of supporting rebels may be to harm their cause.
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A final contribution of the article relates to how we think about the duration of civil wars and their settlement. The existing literature that centers on disarming the rebels at war end focuses largely on the state as the source of bargaining problems that prevent the successful resolution of civil conflict. 47 This article offers an alternative perspective.
If the state expects the rebels' costs of fighting to decrease (and overall capacity to increase) due to external support, and this external support is large enough relative to the government's expected value of fighting, continued fighting becomes more desirable to the government than negotiations and concessions. Thus, it is the rebels' inability to agree not to continue fighting, rather than solely that of the state, that leads to ongoing conflict.
Recognition of the differential effects of external support has important implications for third parties promoting conflict resolution. Withdrawing highly fungible external support from rebels, effectively reducing uncertainty about rebel war making capacity, can work to incentivize bargaining and concessions, and possibly open the door towards peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover, direct attempts at conflict resolution through diplomacy should directly address the role that highly fungible external support can play in preventing settlement. Our findings suggest that breaking the link between external supporters and rebels can facilitate settlement, not because it weakens rebels, but because it allows the state to see the rebels as more willing to agree to a peace settlement. More effort, then, should be focused on the impact of different types of external support on civil war bargaining and on mechanisms that the international community can employ to help combatants overcome these barriers to civil war settlement.
Notes
1. On average, civil wars last two and a half years; the longest running civil wars span multiple decades.
2. See Aydin (2010) on the strategic choice to intervene.
3. Both Salehyan (2009) and Cederman, Girardin, and emphasize how geography can play a role in prolonging civil conflict for rebels that base in foreign territory, or by making it difficult for states to enact reprisals on ethnic groups across borders.
4. Hazen (2013) provides several cases where rebels appear to negotiate in poor faith while building up supplies to fight.
5. One exception is Svensson (2007) , who suggests that rebels have a commitment problem.
He links this commitment problem to the idea that rebels gain greater bargaining leverage through the settlement process via legitimacy and access to official structures. Our focus here is on the effect of external support to rebels, which is not dependent on a particular settlement being achieved.
6. Zartman (1989) suggests that some longstanding balanced conflicts can become "ripe for resolution."
7. There is a large literature on the mediation of civil wars, which is outside the scope of this study. The focus here is on direct support to rebels, as opposed to conflict resolution efforts.
8. Data on external support are from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Database.
9. This conceptualization of the bargain is parsimonious, but excludes non-aligned actors or actors not directly participating in conflict that may influence conflict dynamics. See Kalyvas 2006; Staniland 2012; and Cunningham 2013. 10 . It is also possible that major attacks on rebels could lead to negative international attention and potentially to international censure or intervention favoring the rebels.
11. Salehyan (2009) also highlights the bargaining problems that rebels face when based on foreign territory.
12. See Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) on the incentives for outside actors to support rebels.
13. Competing arguments exist about the role that fungible resources will have on leader incentives at the state-level, particularly with regard to the decision to democratize.
See Boix (2003) and Freeman and Quinn (2012) .
14. We think of the probabilities as expected shares of the outcome, commonly known; so, if the payoffs are p − c 1 and 1 − p − c 2 , then that means one side receives p and the other 1 − p, as fractions of the whole.
15. It may also be the case that the rebels are receiving external support before bargaining with the government. To simplify the model and without loss of generalizability, we normalize any external support to the rebels prior to bargaining to be equal to 0.
16. The effect of the benefits of external support, e, can make the rebels more optimistic about fighting the government by increasing the probability that the rebels prevail and/or lowering the rebels' costs of fighting.
17. Although we treat external support as exogenous in this model, we acknowledge that the decision of third parties to lend external support is strategic. While we do not model this decision, the external support to the rebels might be thought of as the outcome of another game in which the supporter optimizes who to lend to and when to lend support based on the characteristics of the civil conflict.
18. The model also yields implications about how much governments are likely to concede, however we focus exclusively on the conflict termination implications here. 27. To be coded as at parity, the ratio of troops must be equivalent to 1.
28. In additional robustness checks, we used a ratio of state to rebel troops in lieu of these indicators. The results on external financial support remain negative and significant at the 0.05 level.
29. Intelligence support does not include use of a third party's satellites or other types of intelligence infrastructure.
30. Each of these types of support can be reasonably argued to decrease the chance of war termination. Timely intelligence can make rebels more effective even given that most rebel groups are weak compared to the states they fight. More capable rebels may be less likely to be defeated, leading to a negative effect for intelligence support on war termination. Regan (2002) shows a generally negative effect on conflict termination when the intervention is in support of one particular side. Direct troop support to rebels may have a negative effect on conflict termination. Salehyan (2009) shows that rebels can more easily sustain a challenge to the state when they operate in sheltered territory.
Thus, rebels receiving territorial support may be less likely to see war end in any given year.
31. In additional tests, we control for whether the conflict is ethnic in nature, whether the outcome of the conflict is a rebel victory, and whether the civil war could be classified as a coup. The results remain similar to the analyses presented in Table 1. 32. In an additional unreported test, we disaggregated the type of support given to states into troop support, financial support, and intelligence. These analyses show that both troop support and financial support provided to the state are associated with a decreased chance of war end.
33. As war termination is relatively rare, we reproduced these analyses using rare events logit (see King and Zeng (2001) 41. Reproducing these analyses with a one-year lag in external support returns coefficients of similar size and significance for external support.
42. P-value is equal to 0.082.
43.
In an alternative test, we also control for the number of external supporters. See Data Appendix Table 4 . The results on financial support are similar to the model presented here.
More external supporters is associated with a greater chance of war end. Future research should address more directly how a diversity of supporters influences war dynamics.
44. Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) suggest that more than 90% of LTTE funding is externally provided.
45. Some actors may also seek to use support to rebels to undermine a rival.
46. Kuperman (2008) addresses a similar issue with respect to humanitarian assistance, highlighting the moral hazard created when the international community responds to genocide Note: Reporting IV probit with robust standard errors clustered on dyad. † p < .10; * p < .05; * * p < .01; * * * p < .001 
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